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Abstract

YASMINE ELISABETH ALLEN: HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING 101:
REGULATORY IMPACT IN AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN FINANCIAL
MARKETS
(under the direction of Bonnie Van Ness)
High frequency trading has impacted the American and European financial markets
through its advanced algorithms, rapid speed, and preferential treatment from purchasing
information and co-location from exchanges. High frequency trading alone is not
harmful, but without proper regulations it can hurt the financial markets. In this thesis, I
researched implemented regulations, the consequences of those regulations, and pending
new regulations. To gather information, I studied relevant research on the topic, including
numerous academic articles and books to get a broader view of the issues. Through my
research, I have found that previous regulations implemented by American and European
regulatory agencies have benefitted high frequency trading firms, and that exchanges,
through selling information via co-location, have created an environment that benefits
high frequency traders. High frequency trading firms are affecting the market in a
negative way by providing a false sense of liquidity while acting as a market makers and
by purchasing preferential information and access to the financial markets.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
“The market is like a shattered vase that is now held together with glue called
high frequency trading (HFT), and that glue is weak” (Arnuk & Saluzzi, 2012, p. 8).
Deeply-rooted in the U.S and European markets is a predator. That predator is
eating from the average person’s hard earned money. That predator dominated more than
half of the U.S market in 2009 and made over $5 billions in earnings (Serbera &
Paumard, 2016). This predator is called high frequency trading. High frequency trading is
high speed trading through the use of algorithms to earn advantages in the financial
markets based on speed. High frequency traders transact in milliseconds and nanoseconds
using advanced computer systems and co-location.
High frequency trading in itself is neither good nor bad, but is a part of the
technological advances that have developed during the 20 and 21st centuries. The
technology behind high frequency trading is not unique to the stock market, technological
advances are happening in all industries across the world. With new technology comes
new guidelines that one has to follow for the markets to function properly. High
frequency traders must, as Ted Kaufman explains in Broken Markets (Arnuk & Saluzzi,
2012), operate within a framework. Appropriate framework is where high frequency
trading is lacking and where the correct regulations must be implemented to help set
things straight. New innovations and technological advances are detrimental to future
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growth and development (Bréhier, 2013). High frequency trading is the result of these
new innovations mixed with legislative actions that allowed high frequency trading firms
to become the massive trading machines they are today.
According to Patterson (2012) in August 2008 around 90 percent or more of the
orders that entered the market were canceled, and in the time frame, from 2009-2011, 60
percent of orders were canceled within one second (Gregoriou, 2015). The speed at
which high frequency traders entered and canceled orders was automated and could not
be accomplished or even noticed by humans. The problem might not lie in the fact that
computers trade fast and with accuracy (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2014), but the fact that
the US exchange system is not built for this type of trading (Patterson). The US stock
market had become a complex system but was still operating on a simple platform.
High frequency trading is a huge source of profits. High frequency trading firms
rarely hold positions overnight and work more as market makers than traders (Patterson,
2012). High frequency trading firms are different from traditional market makers in that
they are not regulated and registered as market makers, they operate freely and without
most traders’ knowledge (Lewis, 2014). That high frequency trading is complex and hard
to understand is something on which most everyone who has heard about it agrees. In this
thesis I will discuss how high frequency trading affects the legal and economic realms in
America and Europe. From a legal perspective, the government and regulatory authorities
have to decide which laws to implement to ensure safe and efficient markets. As
discussed later in this thesis, regulations can also hurt the market if not implemented
correctly. High frequency trading affects the economy of a country through how it affects
the trust of the everyday investor.
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CHAPTER II: HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING
Technological advancement with high frequency trading started back in the
1990’s (Patterson, 2012) and has continued growing and developing in the stock market
since then. Wall Street is no longer what it was in the 80’s. Trading floors hardly exist
anymore because the human capacity to trade is no longer sufficient in the technological
driven world we live in today. High frequency traders trade through computer algorithms
instead of specialists. Dating back to 1997 when IBM’s robot Deep Blue beat the world
chess champion in chess (International Business Machines Corporation [IBM]), we have
known that computers can out speed and outsmart the human brain in certain tasks. In the
case of high frequency trading, computers have done just that. High frequency trading
firms transact at a speed much faster than a human eye can blink and they are trading
faster than a regular investor with a computer with high-speed Internet could ever
achieve. According to Gregoriou (2015) high frequency trading is “the use of propriety
trading algorithms which are executed with the help of superfast computers to make a
profit on the basis of informational speed advantage measured in milliseconds; rapid
entry and exit from the order stream may fetch a small fractional profit but the large
volume turns that into substantial sums for the HF traders.” (p. 113)
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A. U.S. STOCK MARKET HISTORY
In 1792, 24 brokers came together outside 68 Wall Street in New York to sign the
Buttonwood Agreement to begin trading securities (The New York Stock Exchange
[NYSE]). Since then, the NYSE has been an ever evolving market. Many more
exchanges have come into existence. Some of them, like BATS, started in 2005 (Bats
Exchange), serve as alternatives to the more traditional exchanges, such as the NYSE and
NASDAQ.
Although the theoretical purpose of US Stock markets, to efficiently bring
together buyers and sellers, has not changed, the day-to-day working reality has changed
since the opening of NYSE in 1792. Today, most exchanges are for-profit companies and
these companies make more money for their shareholders when traders, for instance, high
frequency traders, use their venues to trade. Profit-driven exchanges’ priorities are no
longer the everyday long-term investor, but instead their priorities lie with the traders
generating the most income for their shareholders. Hence, these exchanges cater to the
high frequency traders. It is not possible, nor plausible, for human investors to trade the
same volume as a high frequency trading firm and it is not feasible for most investors to
pay for preferential access via co-location, which means that the for-profit exchanges
would lose money if they catered to long-term investors
B. ALGORITHMIC TRADING
Algorithmic trading started in the 90’s (Bréhier, 2013) and has, like many other
technologies grown and expanded at a rapid speed. Algorithmic trading has grown to
become half of the US equity market (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2014). There are many
different forms of algorithmic trading, some use algorithms to detect news updates and
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others use algorithms to detect price discrepancies. Algorithms can scan news releases
and use artificial intelligence to interpret the news and employ algorithms to determine
the best trading strategy based on the information from the news. Algorithmic trading can
be used to correct price discrepancies between two exchanges. When prices on different
exchanges do not match up, algorithms can choose to buy or sell stock to take advantage
of the price discrepancy. Algorithmic trading is only going to increase as we move
forward in the 21st century. Another type of algorithmic trading is high frequency trading.
High frequency trading uses mathematical algorithms to determine what trade to make
and to execute that trade at an extremely rapid speed to earn very small profits per trade.
According to Harris (2013) several reliable studies have shown that transaction
cost has decreased since algorithmic trading became part of the financial markets. The
decrease in transaction cost is due to the fact that computers have advantages over human
traders in that they have seamless attention spans, follow instructions precisely as told, do
not let any emotions cloud or act on their judgment, can learn and watch thousands of
different sources for information at the same time, do not cheat, cost less than their
human counterpart, and they do not require as much office space. (Harris)
Harris (2013) describes the different categories of algorithmic trading: The first
category is called dealing and arbitrage and according to the article it is the most common
form of algorithmic trading. Dealing and arbitrage adds value to the market through
offering liquidity, or moving liquidity to and from different markets. Another category
that Harris discussed monitors newsfeeds for information regarding particular firms.
These algorithms monitor newsfeeds and interpret and trade on the news based on the
data collected. To lose to someone who is better informed, is nothing new, however many
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people dislike the idea that they lose only because they cannot act as quickly as
algorithmic traders can about fundamental news events. (Harris)
C. HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING HISTORY
Humans have and hopefully always will try to come up with new innovations to
improve their existence. When the Internet began in the 1980’s the world began to
change, and the stock market followed this trend. The desire to build faster, more
powerful computers, and to use more complex and extensive programming started when
investment companies and the exchanges realized how much money there was to be
made in the high frequency trading business. (Patterson, 2012)
High frequency trading started earlier than what most would assume, in the 1990’s
(Patterson, 2012). Early high frequency trading was simple computer trading operations
linking to an exchange. Due to regulations, such as Regulation alternative trading systems
(Reg ATS) and Regulation national market system (Reg NMS), and advances in
technology, high frequency traders were able to grow and become the powerful and fast
machines that they are today.
Before the aforementioned regulations came into place, a company by the name of
Instinet was using an alternative trading system to trade. Instinet users would frequently
place I-Only orders to trade (Arnuk & Saluzzi, 2012). I-Only orders were popular as
these orders were seen by only institutional investors. I-only orders were large in size but
as they were only seen by other institutions wanting to transact in large quantities, I-only
orders did not move the price when executed. Instinet offered I-only since the firm did
not believe that one market was made for all different types of trading (Arnuk & Saluzzi).
When Reg ATS was implemented, Instinet became a dominant ECN (Arnuk & Saluzzi).
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ECNs are Electronic Communication Networks and they have the benefit of
anonymously matching buyer and seller, without the need of human intervention (Bodie,
Kane & Marcus, 2014). Although matching could be done anonymously, the passage of
Reg ATS required Instinet to display its private quotes—its I-only orders. According to
Arnuk & Saluzzi, Reg ATS was created, more or less, to stop I-only orders. The stopping
of I-only orders through Reg ATS was the first real start to high frequency trader’s major
take-over of the U.S. markets (Arnuk & Saluzzi). Reg ATS added more transparency in
an attempt to make the market fairer as more traders could see more quotes. But, some of
the traders benefiting from that transparency included high frequency traders. A
revolution of algorithmic trading had begun, thanks to the regulations implemented by
the SEC, high frequency traders had not only survived because of their strategies using
advanced algorithms, but also because various exchanges and SEC regulations helped
them. According to Patterson (2012), this help included the SEC putting the interests of
high frequency traders above all other participants in the market through regulation, and
caused the creation of the mechanism that high frequency traders needed to succeed.
Just a little over a decade ago, most stocks were traded by a broker on the NYSE
or NASDAQ. In ten years the markets have rapidly changed. Just over ten years ago, the
SEC required all US stock markets to switch to the decimal system. Spreads became
smaller very quickly as did the trade sizes and quoted depth. Because of the regulation,
high frequency trading started growing even more, and by 2009 high frequency traders
had 70% of the market (Arnuk & Saluzzi, 2012). With the growth of high frequency
trading came more structure risk. A smaller spread and smaller trade sizes fueled the
growth of high frequency trading firms. A high frequency trader is a short term trader in
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its truest form, high frequency traders transact large quantities of small trades, instead of
having fewer, but larger trades.
Reg NMS was implemented in 2007 (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission)
and mandated the current rules for disseminating the national best bid and offer (NBBO).
The NBBO is the national best bid and offer from all trading venues. With Reg NMS, an
order is automatically routed to the exchange with the best price, even if that means that
the entire order will not be filled on that one exchange.
Technological advances have made the markets operate faster and more efficiently.
The main problem is not how to get rid of high frequency trading, but how to embrace
technology and at the same time have it under control.
D. HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING METHODS
High frequency trading works in different ways depending on the type of high
frequency trading and the goals of high frequency traders. The basic concept of high
frequency trading is to use a network of computers co-located at the various exchanges to
trade. Because the system uses algorithms to trade, it can execute the trades faster than a
human can blink. It can do so as computers are not affected by emotions and feelings,
and computers have advanced processing software already built in. Humans must process
the information and make a decision to trade, which takes far longer. Computers
compared to human traders are also able to simultaneously gather information from a
large scope of information sources. The computers can then process that information
faster than regular investors, all the while making trading decisions, which causes the
high frequency traders to enter and cancel orders based on the new information received.
A regular trader would have great difficulty keeping track of so much information at
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once. That computers have the above stated advantages can be both negative and
positive. The positive includes that the way we trade becomes more efficient as the use of
computers and technology increases, the cost gets lower as technology is expanded, and
we no longer need as much human capital since computers can now take over many of
the jobs of humans. On the other hand, the financial markets are not regulated well
enough for computers to function without human intervention. An unfair market is not to
any institutional or human investor’s advantage, and the institutional investors are the
ones investing capital into the market.
Unlike human traders who buy and sell securities based on fundamental or
technical information, high frequency trading firms buy and sell based on speed and
information gained through co-located servers. High frequency traders purchase
preferential access to the exchanges, and hence the order and trade information of the
exchange, via co-location, which implicitly hurts the retail investor who does not have
this advantage. High frequency traders make money by beating other traders to the trade.
High frequency traders are not like regular investors as they do not care about the
security they trade since they will not hold on to it for long (Gregoriou, 2015). If a stock
broker enters an order to sell 1000 shares of XYZ company, the high frequency trading
firm’s co-located computer detects that the order has been entered and will execute. The
high frequency trading firm, using its speed and co-located servers, beats the stock broker
to another exchange, buys the XYZ stock, and then sells it to the broker for a higher
price. The regular investor would lose “only” a few cents per trade, which to most
investors is not a huge loss. That is why it took so long for the market to discover what
high frequency traders were doing. High frequency trading firms were making a lot of
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money on earning a few cents from a large number of investors. The average return that a
high frequency trader makes on one transaction is $5.05 (Goldstein, Kumar & Graves,
2014). A high frequency trading firm that ‘front runs’ had gross trading profits of
$45,267 per day in 2010, compared to gross profits of $2,461 per day for a firm that does
not front run (Goldstein, Kumar & Graves) If one investor lost the same amount that high
frequency traders made, the practice would have been noticed sooner.
When discussing what high frequency traders are doing to hurt the market, the
term front running is widely used (Harris, 2013). Front running is discussed in the book
Flash Boys by Michal Lewis (2014). High frequency traders are front running non-high
frequency traders and thus make non-high frequency traders’ trades more
expensive. There are two types of front runners according to Harris:
1) Order anticipation is when high frequency traders anticipate what order the
trader will submit. High frequency traders are able to anticipate an order by using
algorithms to examine previous orders and trades to predict when a trader will split up a
large order. High frequency trading firms will then trade ahead of the trader with their
faster co-located computers and profit from the price change they initiate.
2) Quote matching refers to standing orders that have already been posted. High
frequency trading firms simply trade ahead of orders and increase the price slightly or
trade in another venue. When prices change in favor of high frequency traders, they
profit, and when it does not, high frequency traders immediately exit their orders by
trading with standing limit orders. “They profit by extracting option values from standing
limit orders submitted by slower traders” (Harris, 2013, p.7). Quote matching causes
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problems since the trader who originally issued the standing order is forced to trade when
they do not want to and fail to trade when they wish to. (Harris)
Other tactics that the high frequency traders use are quote stuffing, spoofing and
momentum ignition (Gregoriou, 2015). Quote stuffing is when the high frequency firms
enter and immediately cancel a multitude of orders for a security. High frequency trading
firms enter a multitude of orders to slow down competition. When quotes are entered,
whether reasonably near the best bid or offer or far away from the best prices, other
traders have to analyze these quotes, which creates an advantage for the high frequency
trading firm that placed the orders. Spoofing is when one trader is teasing information
from other traders by placing and canceling orders (Pandey & Wu, 2015) Placing “fake”
orders to move the price in a particular direction is illegal (U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission), but it can be hard to prove. Momentum ignition is when a high frequency
firm enters orders, sometimes in combination with spreading false rumors, to make other
traders start trading more rapidly to make the price move up or down faster. All of these
different strategies are on the verge of being illegal, but hard to prove as they are done at
such rapid speed.
E. HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING ORIGINS
We live in a technology driven society where companies and people strive to be
as effective and efficient as possible. It is human nature to develop innovations to make
life easier, cheaper, more efficient, etc. Trading in the security markets is no different.
Using computers to trade instead of humans was more a question about when than why
and how. In the book, Dark pools, Scott Patterson (2012) discusses how the value of
computer programmers has increased in the stock market. Using algorithms to trade is not
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a problem in itself, even algorithmic trading with very rapid speed is not a problem. The
problem, or the reason high frequency trading is the widely debated topic that it is today,
is due to profit driven traders coupled with regulation that enables these traders to take
advantage of others.
When high frequency trading, as we know it today, started it was kept in the dark,
it was secret. And no wonder, since the people who started it were sitting on a gold mine.
The book flash boys (Lewis, 2014) discusses how a company, Spread Networks, wanted
to lay a fiber optic cable line between Chicago and New York. The cable was 825 miles
long and the price tag was $300-million (Gregoriou, 2015). According to Lewis, no one
understood why a company wanted to spend all that money on a cable that would run
straight from New York to Chicago; and when an outsider asked, he was told it was a
secret project (Lewis). The reason why the line was so important was because high
frequency trading firms compete on speed, and by having a straight optical cable between
the exchanges, a firm buying space on that cable could win the game—make the distance
faster, which would generate higher profits. If other firms knew about the high speed
cable, they would want in and would compete at the same speed. High frequency trading
only works for the company that is the fastest. High frequency trading companies
compete using co-location to gain speed as well. Co-location is the term for having a
firm’s computer located in the same facility as the exchange’s matching engine. Being
co-located means that a company can have access to the exchange’s data—trade and
quote information—faster as the firm will not have to wait for the information to travel
through the public feed. To a regular person, co-location seems ridiculous, but to a high
frequency trader, it is everything, it can be all about who is a millisecond faster.
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F. DARK POOLS
Dark pools originated for investors that wanted anonymity when trading large
orders. When the financial markets started to change due to all the rules and regulations
implemented by the SEC, especially with Reg NMS, it became hard for investors to trade
larger blocks of stocks without moving the price in the market due to high frequency
trading front running them (Arnuk & Saluzzi, 2012) In response to the new regulations
the exchanges and some investment banks created dark pools, where the bid and ask
prices were hidden and the pool, theoretically, offered full anonymity. Since the orders
submitted to the dark pools were hidden, and only invited investors could trade in the
pool, high frequency traders could not view these orders. Dark pools also benefited large
traders since orders submitted and executed did not dramatically affect the price of the
stock. If an investor is selling a large order of stocks he/she does not want to move the
price too much since that means less money for the investor who is trying to sell the
stock.
Stock Exchanges, brokers, and owners of automated trading systems, according to
Arnuk and Saluzzi (2012), have helped high frequency traders receive access to dark
pools. One example of high frequency traders having access to dark pools happened in
2011 with Pipeline. According to Arnuk and Saluzzi, Pipeline had secretly traded against
their own investors. In Flash Boys, Lewis (2014) discussed that several investment banks
and financial institutions allowed high frequency traders to enter their dark pools. Lewis
provides more proof of how large financial institutions were using dark pools as a means
to earn more money. Since high frequency traders submit such large amounts of orders,
the financial institutions that allow high frequency traders to use their dark pools to trade,
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earn more money by charging fees to grant access to high frequency trading firms.
Allowing high frequency traders access to the dark pool creates a conflict of interest
between the organization who owns the dark pool and the institutional investor who uses
it. The conflict of interest is particularly troubling when an institutional investor with a
large position in a stock chose to trade in a dark pool to protect their position and the
corresponding orders from high frequency traders, and pays the company that owns the
dark pool for access to trade in it. At the same time, the owners of the same dark pool are
also charging high frequency traders to be allowed to trade in the dark pool with the
institutional investor. A dark pool earns money when trades are executed in the pool
(Patterson, 2012). Dark pools allow high frequency trading firms access as they are
supplying such large quantities of orders, and the larger the number of orders submitted
to a particular pool, the higher the probability that orders will execute in that pool.
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CHAPTER III: THE IMPACT OF HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING ON THE STOCK
MARKET
In the not too distant past, market makers were either specialists (on the NYSE) or
dealers (on NASDAQ) who were acting as liquidity providers to the financial markets
and benefiting from the market maker’s spread. Now, according to the Guilbaud and
Pham (2013), any market participant can act as a market maker because of the rise of
electronic trading. The ease of acting as a liquidity provider has created competition in
liquidity provision in the financial markets. This competition has reduced effective
market spreads and reduced indirect cost (Guilbaud & Pham). High frequency traders act
as market makers as they constantly submit and cancel orders. High frequency traders
may detect when an order is placed and partially executed at one exchange, but not
fulfilled at that exchange. With high speed, the high frequency trader, can reach another
exchange with the next NBBO price, purchase the stock, raise price slightly, sell it back
to the original investor who entered the order, and pocket the different prices, or spread,
between the two prices. Even though the aforementioned order would likely have been
filled as it worked through the posted liquidity on the various exchanges, the high
frequency trader is considered to be acting like a market maker in the sense that it
provided liquidity to the unfulfilled portion of the order. However, high frequency
traders are not under the same obligations as a traditional market maker regarding when
or how much liquidity must be provided. Proponents of high frequency trading see it as a
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way to increase liquidity and efficiency in the financial markets. Those who are
opposed see high frequency trading as an extra cost on a market that is already efficient,
adding another middle man. (Patterson, 2012)
High frequency trading firms turned to leverage to maximize profits. According to
Patterson (2012) in the late 2000’s, high frequency firms were leveraged with a ratio
from 50 to 1. High frequency traders were able to become so highly leveraged as they
were turning profits almost every day (Patterson), which cause banks and other investors
to trust high frequency trading firms with their money.
Another reasonably recent innovation in financial markets is the
maker/taker system (Gregoriou, 2015). This system is used by many exchanges and
trading venues. Although the maker/taker rebates/fees vary from exchange to exchange,
the most frequently used system pays (rebates) a trader who provides liquidity and
charges a fee to the trader who takes liquidity (Gregoriou). Since the fee charged for
taking liquidity is necessarily larger that the rebate provided to the liquidity provider, the
exchange where the trade takes place pockets the difference. The more liquidity
supplying orders that are entered at a particular venue, the higher the probability that one
of those orders execute and provide liquidity to a liquidity demanding order. The
exchanges earn more money the more trades that execute at their exchanges–they pocket
more differences between the make and take amounts. Hence, high frequency traders
receive special privileges as they submit a large quantity of orders to the exchanges
(Arnuk & Saluzzi, 2012). Some exchanges increase the maker rebate for traders who
transaction a higher quantity of trades at their venue (Patterson, 2012). Another privilege
that high frequency traders pay for, which is also a problem to the regular investor, is
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preferential access via co-location. Exchanges have an incentive to sell preferential
access to the exchange’s trade and quote information since exchanges earn money from
co-location fees. High frequency traders are willing to pay for co-location since the closer
a firm’s co-located computer is to the exchange’s main computer terminal, the faster the
co-located firm gets the information and the shorter the distance the co-located firm’s
algorithmic orders need to travel, which gives the co-located high frequency trading firm
an advantage in the speed game. To illustrate the outcome of winning at the speed game,
one high frequency trading firm reported that it had gone four years without a loss for the
day (Lewis, 2014).
At the same time that high frequency trading firms are earning more
money by being faster to the trade, the exchanges are also earning more money. The
exchanges that are not selling co-location are not. High frequency firms submit orders
where they have the best advantage, which include faster execution and better
information via co-location. Exchanges not selling co-location will not receive the large
quantity of orders from high frequency traders, hence will likely not be executing the
same quantity of trades. Not allowing co-location are causing the investors at exchanges
that do not allow co-location to have higher trading costs since their orders cannot be
executed at the best price (Pandey & Wu, 2015). The conflict of interest, selling colocation to high frequency traders, continues as for-profit exchanges must cater to the
traders who supply them with the most profits (Arnuk & Saluzzi, 2012).
High frequency trading firms also gain an advantage through purchasing
information about firms’ financial reports before other institutional investors. High
frequency trading firms may purchase the financial report directly from the same provider
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that will send out this information to other business sources, who then will release them
to the public investor (Gregoriou, 2015). Gregoriou discusses an example where a high
frequency trading firm purchased access to the financial report of a company named
ULTA. On December 5th 2013 ULTA’s stock price dropped rapidly because high
frequency traders received information about ULTA’s earnings milliseconds before it
reached the public, and started trading on the information. High frequency traders sold
$800,000 worth of stock in those milliseconds. The institutional investors who received
the news milliseconds later were already starting out trading at a loss as the price of the
stock had already dropped by the time they were able to react to the information from the
financial report.
A. LIQUIDITY PROBLEMS
Another debated topic is whether or not high frequency traders supply liquidity to
the market. High frequency traders may supply liquidity in the sense that they are
entering and executing large quantities of orders. According to Gregoriou (2015) liquidity
is the fine balance and combination of systemic liquidity in market stress and search
liquidity in a normal market. Liquidity in market stress is liquidity that is provided when
the market is going down and search liquidity is liquidity that is provided in a stable and
efficient market. High frequency trading does not meet both of these liquidity
requirement since high frequency traders are not required to provide liquidity in market
stress (Gregoriou).
By increasing the speed at which orders can be placed and canceled, an illusion of
liquidity is created (Patterson, 2012). Liquidity, the ease with which one can convert an
asset to cash, without suffering a loss, is important to investors. When a stock is liquid,
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investors can enter the market (buy stock) and feel confident that they can sell the stock
without losing a lot of money. Liquid markets make investors comfortable to take more
risk (Patterson). Bréhier (2013) states, “Some studies conclude that it [high frequency
traders] provides liquidity to markets”, when, in reality, high frequency traders provide
false liquidity (Lewis, 2014; and Patterson, 2012). High frequency traders buy and sell
large quantity of shares every day as long as the markets are in their favor. In downturns,
high frequency traders do not provide liquidity, they instead take and demand the little
liquidity that is left in the market. (Arnuk & Saluzzi, 2012). Going from increments of
$1/8 and $1/16 to a 100 decimal point system in the stock market caused limit orders to
be less clustered, and price quotes to become thinner and spread out (Arnuk & Saluzzi,).
A lack of liquidity may be a problem when the public loses trust in the market.
More than $250 billion dollars have been withdrawn from domestic equity mutual funds
in the United States since 2010 (Arnuk & Saluzzi, 2012). Because of withdrawn money
in domestic equity mutual funds, the economy as a whole can suffer since companies
depend on the financial markets as a way of raising capital (Arnuk & Saluzzi). According
to Arnuk and Saluzzi, liquidity in the market was more stable and easier to predict when
long term investors were the source of liquidity. The liquidity provided was “real”, unlike
the liquidity provided by high frequency traders, which is not. According to Bréhier
(2013) there are two different types of liquidity to be considered. There is “natural
liquidity”, which is what the economic players provide to the market, and there is
“liquidity of opportunity”, which is what is provided when a trader takes a tactical
position. Liquidity of opportunity currently accounts for 80% of the market, and it is the
category of liquidity provided by high frequency traders.
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B. COST
The few cents that an institutional investor loses when large orders are executed at
different prices as the order moves from exchange to exchange getting partial executions
along the way do not, generally, add up to a large sum of money. However, when
considering the large number of trades that are being partially executed at multiple
exchanges by high frequency trading firms, the profits that high frequency trading firms
are making becomes large. Patterson (2012) describes the situation in the book, Dark
Pools, as follows: when you lose money in a mutual fund due to high frequency traders
front-running you, even if it is not a considerable amount, it is money that you can no
longer reinvest in the market. That reinvestment value will add up if calculated over a
long period of time and it turns out to be a large sum of money that an institutional
investor could have saved, but failed to do so due to high frequency trading.
C. FLASH CRASH
The flash crash occurred on May 6th 2010. According to SEC’s website, the
equity market had a severe disturbance that occurred in the matter of minutes. A large
number of securities started to decline rapidly and then started to increase again once the
problem was located. The fast shift and high volatility in prices did not go unnoticed by
the market. A lot of trades were executed at a severely low prices. According to the SEC,
“including many that were more than 60% away from pre-decline prices and were broken
by the exchanges and FINRA” (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC]). The
Dow Jones average fell by 1,000 points for the day, and it fell by 583 points within seven
minutes (Arnuk & Saluzzi, 2012).

26

High frequency trading was part of the flash crash according to Arnuk and Saluzzi
(2012). When the flash crash started and the Dow Jones started to drop rapidly; a human
trader could detect that something was fundamentally wrong, but a computer working via
algorithms could not. Goldstein, Kumar and Graves (2014) state that high frequency
traders kept pushing down the prices by aggressively selling what stock they currently
owned, which meant that trading volume increased for high frequency traders. When the
volume increased, volatility increased, which prompted long term investors to withdraw
from the market and left high frequency traders to compete with themselves. Eventually,
high frequency traders backed out too and liquidity in the market plummeted further. The
reason why liquidity disappeared is because the “liquidity” provided by high frequency
traders is provided only when the markets are normal (Gregoriou, 2015). When the
markets start to shift, and volatility increases, high frequency traders “take” the liquidity.
When the source of the flash crash was discovered, the market started to bounce back.
According to Bodie, Kane, and Marcus (2014), the SEC approved circuit breakers
to prevent this type of algorithmic malfunction in the future. If a stock increases or
decreases more than 10% within a 5-minute period, the circuit breaker will halt trading.
The circuit breaker rule was implemented in a series of stages (Bodie, Kane & Marcus).
In March 2016, a man named Navinder Sarao was charged by the court in
England to be extradited to the United States since he allegedly played a role in the flash
crash. According to Forbes, Sarao used spoofing to earn an advantage and money in the
U.S. market (Gara, 2016). Spoofing is illegal and as stated above in this thesis, spoofing
is when one trader is teasing information from other traders by placing and canceling fake
orders. Although the flash crash happened five years ago, who or what caused the flash
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crash is still uncertain. Most sources agree that algorithmic trading had some part in it
(Goldstein, Kumar & Graves, 2014), and that it brought attention to the fragile U.S.
market (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2014).
D. HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING BENEFITS
Brogaard, Hendershott, Hunt & Ysusi (2014) relay that most
academic research points towards high frequency trading having improved measures of
financial market quality such as volatility and liquidity. Menkveld (2013) claims that
high frequency trading firms decrease the spread by 50%. Carrion (2013) claims that
when spreads are wide high frequency trading firms provide liquidity. However,
Brogaard, Hendershott, Hunt and Ysusi claims that liquidity might only help a few
investors, but not institutional investor. Gregoriou (2015) states that regardless if high
frequency traders have provided real liquidity or not, they have helped narrow the spread,
which is beneficial to all investors since the fees paid by investors are not as high.
However, Gregoriou fails to mention what happens to the traditional market makers when
unregulated high frequency traders take their place. Bréhier (2013) states that because
high frequency traders have taken over the roles of traditional market makers, they have
encouraged market transparency, as well as helped the overall economy by providing
additional liquidity, since it will become easier for a company to obtain capital for
investments. As described earlier in the thesis, high frequency traders supply a false sort
of liquidity that is beneficial only when markets are running smoothly. Just because
studies show that market liquidity has improved in the last few years, it does not mean
that high frequency traders are responsible for the improvement. Regulations, such as
Reg NMS, may have helped with improving market liquidity (Bréhier)
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CHAPTER IV: CURRENT REGULATIONS REGARDING HIGH FREQUENCY
TRADING
“The mission of the SEC is to protect investors; maintain fair, orderly, and
efficient markets; and facilitate capital formation. The SEC strives to promote a market
environment that is worthy of the public's trust”( U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission[SEC]). The SEC must be careful not to harm the markets when considering
new legislative action. Tough regulations may stifle market advances and innovations,
which are two drivers for competition (Bréhier, 2013).
A. U.S. MARKET
Regulation has helped pave the way for high frequency trading in both U.S. and
European markets (Gregoriou, 2015). In 1998, the SEC approved Regulation Alternative
Trading Systems (Reg ATS)( U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission). Reg ATS was
implemented to regulate a new method used to trade: Electronic communication networks
(ECNs). The SEC wanted to add more transparency to the markets. Through Reg ATS,
most ECNs were forced to show all of their orders to the public. According to Arnuk and
Saluzzi (2012), Reg ATS “required alternative trading systems that trade 5 percent or
more of the volume in national market system securities to be linked with a registered
market in order to disseminate the best priced orders in those national market system
securities displayed in their systems (including institutional orders) into the public quote
stream”(p. 69). The SEC succeeded in adding more transparency, but the added
transparency helped high frequency trading firms succeed.
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Nanex showed that the national best bid and offer spread did not narrow after the
government imposed Regulation National Market System (Reg NMS) in 2007 (Pandey &
Wu, 2015). Reg NMS was to help promote fair price competition. Instead of helping the
market, Reg NMS had unintended consequences according to Lewis (2014). All that Reg
NMS has done is give the illusion of liquidity to the market (Pandey & Wu).
In August 2000, all stocks started trading on a 100-point decimal system (Arnuk
& Saluzzi, 2012). According to Arnuk and Saluzzi, one flaw in Reg NMS is the lack of a
minimum spread or price increment. When pricing changed from$1/8 and $1/16 to
decimals, it became easier for high frequency traders to step in front of other’s orders,
since it required only a penny to do so.
Reg NMS also stipulated that an order to buy or sell a stock had to be routed to
the venue with the best posted price. So, a stock that normally would have traded on the
NYSE now had to go to the exchange with the best price, even if that meant that the order
had to be executed at several different exchanges. Depth at the best price decreased with
decimalization. So, a large order would, most likely, partially execute on multiple
exchanges since, by law, the order had to be routed to the venue with the best price even
if the depth at the best price was not sufficient to cover the order. Inadvertently, Reg
NMS made speed extremely important. The trader who could get an order to the
exchange with the lowest price first would be able to obtain that price. Since high
frequency traders were the fastest traders in the markets, they were able to detect the
large order, trade ahead of the partially-filled order, instantaneously submit an order at a
slightly improved price (in other words, become the next best price) to then trade with the
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partially-filled large order at a profit. Reg NMS enhanced high frequency trading firms’
front running techniques.
Further, Reg NMS also drove many market makers, who dealt with small and
mid-cap stocks, out of business due to margin compressions (Arnuk & Saluzzi, 2012).
Arnuk and Saluzzi state that previous market makers were required to provide liquidity in
the market (when there was no liquidity) and to withdraw liquidity (when liquidity was
too high) to help regulate the market and decrease inventory risk. High frequency traders,
with high volume of order submissions, took the place of traditional market makers, but
without the associated rules and regulations. When liquidity was plentiful, high frequency
traders traded more, which further increased liquidity. When liquidity was low, high
frequency traders withdrew from the markets, thus decreasing liquidity even more.
Average trade size decreased with high frequency traders (in conjunction with
Reg NMS) as large orders had to be routed from exchange to exchange partially filling at
each best price. Partial execution at the best price allowed high frequency trader to front
run partially-filled orders and grab a chunk of the profits. Traditional market makers are
not allowed to front run orders since they have a negative obligation (Gregoriou, 2015).
Having a negative obligation means that market makers are not allowed to interfere with
the market for their own personal gain if the markets are efficient enough that buyers and
sellers match up (Investopedia, 2003).
The reason as to why the SEC implemented regulations, such as Reg ATS and
Reg NMS, have been questioned by many. One thing is certain and that is if not for these
regulations high frequency trading would not have been what it is today (Arnuk &
Saluzzi, 2012). The U.S stock market was long known as the greatest in the world, and a
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big part of the American dream. “Reg ATS killed the goose that laid the golden egg of a
U.S stock market that the rest of the world envied for its capacity to embrace risk and
drive entrepreneurship and innovation in ways that gave birth to entire new industries and
drove U.S economic leadership.” (Arnuk & Saluzzi, p. 202)
B. LULD PLAN
One common measure of market risk is volatility. During the Flash Crash,
volatility increased significantly. The Limit Up/Limit Down (LULD) Plan was created to
prevent high volatility in the stock market (FINRA, 2012). The LULD Plan was filed by
FINRA in 2012 to try to ensure that the markets were kept fair and orderly. According to
FINRA’s website, the LULD Plan should prevent the kind of volatile price movements
that happened during the flash crash in May 2010.
C. EUROPE/SWEDEN
High frequency trading in the London Stock Exchange is not much different than
in American exchanges. Current European regulations (as of July 2010) do not require all
high frequency traders to file transaction reports, and do not require high frequency
traders to be registered under the markets in financial instruments directive (MiFID)
(Brogaard, Hendershott, Hunt & Ysusi, 2014). The rapid changes in financial markets
and time required to pass and implement regulations exist in European markets as well as
U.S. ones. MiFID 1 was implemented in 2007 (Bréhier, 2013), but in 2012 it was already
starting to be revised. MiFID 1 was European markets’ Reg ATS. The directive opened
up competition with technology in the markets (Gregoriou, 2015).
MiFID II, which applies to all member states within the European Union, was
passed in 2014. Regulations from MiFID II deal with the rise of high frequency trading as
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well as algorithmic trading (THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE
COUNCIL, 2014). European legislators are making a clear distinction between
algorithmic trading and high frequency trading to better help the market when regulating
it. MiFID II states that any person who is dealing with high frequency trading falls under
the rules and regulations set forth by MiFID II (Gregoriou, 2015). MiFID II states that all
high frequency trading firms have to register, have to keep records about all orders
placed, cancelled and executed, and that all records need to be available for the
authorities upon request to make sure that the proper regulations are followed
(Gregoriou). MiFID II also states that any investment firm participating in algorithmic
trading and taking a market making strategy has to enter into a written agreement to carry
out the market making position and provide liquidity. Lastly, MiFID II states that the
regulated European markets have to perform tests of existing algorithms in their markets
and limit the ratio of unexecuted orders. Because of these regulations, it will be easier to
detect system capacity being strained, and MiFID II will help the regulated European
markets slow the order flow if system capacity is strained (Gregoriou). The regulated
European markets also have to ensure that are no incentives to encourage disorderly
trading or market abuse. MiFID II requires fees on canceled orders based on how long
they were in force. A fee on canceled orders will impede high frequency traders who
submit large quantities of orders that are in force for less than one second. According to
Gregoriou, the regulated European markets may also have to impose even higher fees on
high frequency traders that constantly cancel and hold orders for a short period of time,
which would further hurt those traders that put a strain on the financial system.
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The same problem that is happening in the American markets, regarding investors
losing their trust in the markets, is happening in the Swedish market as well. When high
frequency traders are able to trade at a rapid speed and in such large quantities, investors
have no method to keep up with that competition, neither do investors have enough
money to buy fast trading computers (Finansliv, 2015). Finansliv.se interviewed Per H
Börjesson who is CEO for Investment AB Spiltan, Börjesson believes that if this trend
with high frequency traders taking over the market and having preferential treatments
within the exchanges continue to happening, the investors will leave the markets. This is
a trend discussed earlier in this paper that is happening in the United States as well. When
investors lose their faith in the market, with no hope to regain it, they stop investing.
Sveriges Radio interviewed Björn Hagström, an Associate Professor of Finance at
Stockholm University, in a radio show called “Robotar tar över ekonomin”. In the
interview Hagström claims that the different types of high frequency traders matter and
that different algorithms exist for the different types of trading. As has been stressed prior
in this thesis, high frequency traders are not long-term investors, who are buying the
stock because they analyzed the company and want to take part in the future of the
company—both the profits and risk associated with stock ownership. According to
Hagström, high frequency traders do not care what they buy, they buy these stocks on the
Swedish exchange only to earn easy money.
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CHAPTER V: HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING: THOSE TO BLAME
How did high frequency trading grow to be such a dominant player in
financial markets? To quote former senator Ted Kauffman, “It is simply a truism that
whenever there is a lot of money surging into a risky area, where change in the market is
dramatic, where there is no transparency and therefore no effective regulation, we have a
prescription for disaster” (Arnuk & Saluzzi, 2012, p. Xii).
If what Kauffman states is true, is there an entity to fault for the problems
associated with high frequency traders in the financial markets? Is it the high frequency
trading firms who have taken advantage of the opportunity created for them, or the
entities who created the opportunity? The answer is both. Most of the discussion
regarding high frequency trading has focused on the negatives of high frequency trading,
include most of my sources for this thesis. The U.S. government through is regulation did
not do enough to prevent the issues with high frequency trading firms. Rather, the
government instituted regulations to help it. If the SEC is constantly lagging the new
technology, new regulations will not be effective. Further, it does not work for
regulations to take over five years to be passed and implemented in a rapidly changing
technology market. If the regulators are addressing a problem that came about five years
ago, the technologically advanced companies are already five years ahead in their new
trading techniques. The argument made by Bréhier (2013) is as follows: ”Professor Jean
Hilaire concludes that the entire history of stock exchanges is dominated by prohibitions
which are continuously being circumvented” (Bréhier, p. 71). We need faster and more
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efficient solutions to the problem at hand so that the regulations are not
circumvented by the time they become effective.
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CHAPTER VI: IEX STOCK EXCHANGE
The Investors’ Exchange, IEX, was founded because of the unfair advantages on
other trading venues. According to the book Flash boys by Michael Lewis (2014), IEX
was started by Brad Katsuyama because he believed that the U.S. stock market was
rigged. Most trading venues allow high frequency traders to purchase preferential access
to the venue via co-location. High frequency traders profit through co-location and the
trading venues share in the profits as well by executing a larger share of market trades.
According to Brad Katsuyama, preferential access created unfair practices, which led to
the stock market being rigged. He quit his job as Global Head of Electronic Sales and
Trading at RBC Capital Markets and started a new trading venue together with other
experienced people in the financial industry. In August of 2015, IEX applied for
exchange status (Investors Exchange [IEX]).
IEX differs from the other trading venues as IEX has created a speed bump to
make the trading equal and fair to all investors. The speed bump creates a delay of three
hundred and fifty millionths of a second (Tepper, 2016). According to IEX, the speed
bump will not affect long-term investors, but it will have a large impact on traders that
compete on speed, like high frequency traders.
A Business Insider article written by Turner (2015) relays that IEX is not the only
exchange with this technique (altering the speed of traders’ market access), but they are
the only ones who use it fairly. The other trading venues alter speed only for those who
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pay for the advantage. According to Pandey and Wu (2015), “IEX is able to route
orders to multiple exchanges simultaneously in order to avoid front-running in a
fragmented market” (p. 56). Since part of the larger problem with high frequency trader
lies with front-running, IEX can help overcome that problem with the help of their speed
bump.
IEX affects the market both positively and negatively, depending on the source.
According to the SEC filing application website, many large investors and investment
banks supports the idea of IEX being approved as an exchange. One of the people that is
in favor of IEX becoming an exchange is Paul M. Russo, managing Director of the
Securities Division for Goldman and Sachs. According to Russo, IEX will help to
enhance the quality of U.S. equity markets. Russo believes that IEX will offer an
exchange where traders who do not value the fastest speed and investors who want to
trade larger blocks of stock will gain. Also according to the SEC filing application
website, Charles M. Jones, Professor of Finance and Economics at Columbia Business
School, wrote a response letter to the SEC not supporting IEX’s application for exchange
status. Jones claims, “The Commission should think twice before approving a national
securities exchange application with these anti-competitive features”. Jones states that the
IEX speed bump is applied in a discriminatory way since the undisplayed orders at the
IEX exchange will have an advantage over displayed orders at other exchanges. The IEX
speed bump would be applied only 15% of the time. Jones analyzed data flow and found
that, through the speed bump, investors with the disadvantage would be impacted by 1.67
cents per share.
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CHAPTER VII: POTENTIAL REGULATIONS
The debate about the harm or aid to market quality brought about by high
frequency trading continues. It is hard to determine a solution or even if a solution is
needed. Harris (2013) suggests that the government enact a regulation requiring
companies to announce to the exchanges when they expect important information to be
revealed during trading hours. Harris also suggested that information should only be
released when the market is closed or at a pre-announced time. Announcing information
only at certain times, liquidity suppliers would have time to assess the impact of the
information and thus not hurt the liquidity of the market. The law suggested by Harris is
an action that many governments have already put in place. Harris’s third and perhaps
most helpful suggestion is that the best way to prevent high frequency traders from taking
over the market would be to use a randomizer. If the regulators would delay each order
between 0 to 10 milliseconds, high frequency traders would only “win” 59.5% of the
time. A randomizer would diminish the problem of front running. It would also lower the
cost of entry and reduce technology expenditures, which would not hurt or affect the
quality of the market. The benefits would also ensure that high frequency trading is a
competitive business where high frequency traders compete only with each other, and not
institutional investors. By having high frequency trading companies compete with each
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other and not ordinary investors, high frequency traders would continue to
improve prices and quoted depth and would also provide the market with low transaction
costs (Harris).
The problem that high frequency traders use algorithms to detect when a larger
order is split and re-routed is hard to counteract without hurting the markets. For
example, regulatory agencies cannot do much without “delaying or reducing the
dissemination of quotes” (Harris, 2013, p. 7). They best way to solve the bigger problem,
which is the existence of hunter/seeker algorithms, is to reduce the information about
order sizes so that algorithms cannot detect them. Markets could report approximate
order sizes instead of giving the actual order depth. The regulatory agencies can report
approximate trade sizes through various buckets, or report on aggregated volumes at
different intervals; incomplete order information together with hidden orders and dark
pools would substantially reduce the ability for high frequency traders to identify future
orders or trades (Harris).
More regulations have been implemented in Europe to regulate high frequency
trading than have been implemented in America. European countries have different laws
on how to regulate high frequency trading. So, the EU has standardized the rules that deal
with high frequency trading through MiFID II. One main difference is that the European
markets have formally stated what high frequency trading is, whereas the regulatory
agencies in America have not. Gregoriou (2015) notes that banning high frequency
trading is not going to solve the problem or help the markets. Pandey and Wu (2015)
claim that high frequency traders, acting like market makers, should be required to have
market maker obligations. If high frequency traders were obligated under law to help
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stabilizing as was the case with market makers, it would take away one of the bigger
concerns with high frequency trading.
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CHAPTER VIII: INVESTOR CONFIDENCE AND ECONOMIC EFFECT
If institutional investors do not believe that markets are fair or safe, they will not
invest in them. And if the institutional investors withdraw from the market, the U.S.
economy, and potentially the world economy, will suffer. Björn Hagströmer, an
Associate Professor of Finance at Stockholm University has said that the largest problem
with high frequency trading is the lack of trust in the markets (Finansliv, 2015). The
concern of investors is evidenced by the decrease of $232 billion in domestic equity
mutual funds between May 2010 and January 2012 (Arnuk & Saluzzi, 2012).
A. GAINS AND LOSES ON HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING
Since high frequency traders took over market making roles, they became
ultimately important for the future success of the exchanges. Since someone has to pay
for others to receive, the short end of the stick happened to be drawn by large mutual
funds that invest private working class Americans savings (Patterson, 2012).
Needless to say, the internet did not exist when the New York stock exchange
started in 1792. At that time, the most convenient way to trade was to have a common
place to go to trade. The New York Stock Exchange and Wall Street became that place.
Specialists worked as market makers on the NYSE and were compensated by the spread
between the buy and ask price. As explained earlier in this thesis, high frequency traders
have taken over the market making role. Patterson (2012) explains the unfairness with a
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market maker acting as a middle man, taking part of the average investor’s profits. In
today’s society, we are no longer in need of the traditional way of trading in a common
place, like the New York stock exchange. Today, many purchases are done through
computers. Market makers may no longer need to match up orders, a computer could do
it and save the investor money. All that is needed, according to Patterson, is to take out
the market maker from the equation, and perhaps, the spread would not exist.
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CONCLUSION
High frequency trading is a form of algorithmic trading using advanced
algorithms and rapid speed to receive information and execute trades through co-located
servers. Even though Arnuk and Saluzzi (2014) note that high frequency trading has
declined, most likely due to increased competition, high frequency traders still had 50%
of the market in 2012. High frequency trading has impacted the American and European
markets tremendously and it paving the way for how future trading within the markets
will be done.
Because of the rules implemented by the SEC, such as Reg ATS and Reg NMS,
high frequency trading has grown and flourished. Through the “transparency”
implemented by Reg ATS, high frequency traders could detect orders that were
previously hidden in the markets. Changing from a $1/8 minimum tick size to a 100-point
decimal system, together with the implementation of Reg NMS, made it cheaper and
easier for high frequency traders to front run other traders. Through Reg NMS, orders had
to be routed to the exchange with the best price. So, a large order would most likely have
to be routed to multiple trading venues, which would lead to high frequency traders
having more opportunities to front run the order. High frequency traders are able to
purchase stock at a low price, and then sell if for a penny or so higher, making a profit.
High frequency traders do this thousands of times per day, earning billions per year. All
while eating away from hardworking Americans’ retirement funds.
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High frequency trading, in itself, is not harmful. However, proper regulations
need to be implemented to deal with the complexity that high frequency trading brings
with it. The European regulatory agencies have, through MiFID II, come a long way in
dealing with high frequency trading. Moving forward into the 21st century, high
frequency trading needs to be constantly monitored and regulations updated, to keep
markets as efficient and fair as possible.
The average American will save for retirement using a 401K plan (or something
similar). What most of these Americans don’t realize is that part of their retirement
savings is being eaten up by high frequency traders. The average individual will never
know that money is missing from his/her savings, because high frequency traders will
take only a little at a time. The small “tax” levied by high frequency traders is small
when it is increasing the price paid by the retirement plan, however, it adds up to a
substantial amount of lost investment at retirement time.
High frequency traders are not destroying the markets and it is not dangerous to
invest your money in the market. High frequency traders will stay in the market and
operate the same way they currently do if no new regulations are implemented. If no
more regulations are implemented the glue that hold together our markets might crack.
Technological advancement in the market should continue to grow and flourish, but it is
important that they do so within the appropriate framework to support that growth.
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